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Abstract This paper studies how to efficiently update the saddle-point strategy, or
security strategy of one player in a matrix game when the other player develops new
actions in the game. It is well known that the saddle-point strategy of one player
can be computed by solving a linear program. Developing a new action will add a
new constraint to the existing LP. Therefore, our problem becomes how to solve the
new LP with a new constraint efficiently. Considering the potentially huge number of
constraints, which corresponds to the large size of the other player’s action set, we use
shadow vertex simplex method, whose computational complexity is lower than linear
with respect to the size of the constraints, as the basis of our iterative algorithm. We
first rebuild the main theorems in shadow vertex method with relaxed assumption to
make sure such method works well in our model, then analyze the probability that the
old optimum remains optimal in the new LP, and finally provides the iterative shadow
vertex method whose computational complexity is shown to be strictly less than that
of shadow vertex method. The simulation results demonstrates our main results about
the probability of re-computing the optimum and the computational complexity of the
iterative shadow vertex method.
1 Introduction
In many non-cooperative games, players can develop new actions as the game is
being played. For example, in cyber-security scenarios, attackers can suddenly start
employing theretofore unknown system vulnerabilities in the form of so-called ’zero-
day attacks’. The goal, then, for the defender, is to quickly and efficiently modify its
response so as to reach an equilibrium of the newly formed game.
This paper focuses on two player zero sum games where one player, say player
2, can develop new actions, and has a growing action set. Player 1, who has a fixed
This work was supported in part by NSF grants 1619339 and 1151076 to Cedric Langbort.
The authors are with the coordinated science lab at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Cham-
paign, IL 61801, US. Email: lichunli,langbort@illinois.edu.
2 Lichun Li and Cedric Langbort
action set, may need to update its strategy to the new saddle-point strategy when
new action is revealed. Player 1’s saddle-point strategy can be computed by solving
a linear program (LP), and adding a new action is nothing more than adding a new
constraint to the existing LP. Hence, our problem becomes how to solve the LP with
a new constraint efficiently.
The corresponding dual problem looks similar to an online LP problem where
new variables are introduced to the existing LP [1, 6, 8, 10, 11]. The key idea to ap-
proximate the optimum in online LP is to assign the new variable 1 if reward is greater
than the shadow price based cost, 0 otherwise. Unlike in the problems considered in
this literature, however, the new variables introduced in the LP are not restricted to
be boolean, and the central idea developed in these papers cannot be applied to our
problem.
Online conic optimization is another online tool which looks for an approximated
optimum of a convex optimization problem where new variables are introduced to the
existing convex optimization [7]. A special requirement in online conic optimization
is that the constraints of variable are separated. Eghbali et.al provides an algorithm to
approximate the optimum based on the form of the optimal primal-dual pair which is
related to the concave conjugate of the objective function [7]. The main issue to adopt
the algorithm in our problem is that to separate the constraints of variables, we need
to reformulate the objective function, and the concave conjugate of the reformulated
objective function is not well defined.
While neither online LP nor online conic optimization can be directly used in our
model, our previous work [3] showed how adaptive multiplicative weights could be
used to find an approximate solution to the fast and efficient saddle-point strategy up-
dating goal as well, by adding a simple condition to the Freund and Schapire scheme.
In this paper, we present an algorithm to solve this updating problem exactly.
Considering that our LP may have a large number of constraints (corresponding
to a large action set of player 2), we use shadow vertex method, whose computational
complexity grows very slowly with respect to the number of constraints, as the basis
for our iterative algorithm. Shadow vertex method is a simplex method to solve LP.
It first projects the feasible set into a two dimensional plane where the projection of
the optimal vertex is still a vertex of the projection of the feasible set, and then walks
along the vertices of the projected set to find the optimal one. Because our variables
are in the probability space, the non-degeneracy assumption in the original shadow
vertex method is violated. Therefore, we first rebuild the main theorems in shadow
vertex method with a relaxed non-degeneracy assumption to make sure that shadow
vertex methods works well in our model.
Recomputing the optimum is not always necessary when player 2 generates a
new action, or in other words, a new constraint is added to the existing LP. If the
old optimum satisfies the new constraint, then it remains optimal in the new LP. We
further analyze the probability that the old optimum remains optimal in the new LP,
and find that if every vertex has the same probability to be the optimal vertex, then the
probability that old optimum remains optimal in the new LP increases with respect
to the number of constraints. This is because as the number of constraints increases,
the feasible set is getting smaller, and it is less possible for the new constraint to cut
the optimal vertex off.
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If the old optimum is not optimal any more in the new LP, we do not need to start
the search all over again. Instead, we can test the feasibility of the previously visited
shadow vertices one by one, find out the the feasible one with the best objective value,
and use it as the original shadow vertex to start the search. We call the algorithm
the iterative shadow vertex method, and show that the computational complexity of
iterative shadow vertex method is strictly less than that of regular shadow vertex
method.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II states the problem, and
Section III discusses the shadow vertex simplex method with the presence of the
probability vector variable. Section IV presents the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion of unchanging security strategy and the corresponding possibility, and Section V
provides the iterative shadow vertex method and the computational complexity anal-
ysis. The simulation results are given in Section VI, followed by the conclusion in
Section VII.
2 Matrix Games with Growing Action Set on One Side
Let Rn denote the n dimensional real space. For a finite set S, |S| denotes its cardinal-
ity, and ∆(S) is the set of probability space over S. Vector 1 and 0 are column vectors
(whose dimension will be clear from context) with all their elements to be one and
zero, respectively. In is an n dimensional identity matrix and ei is the ith column of In.
Let u and v be two n-dimensional vectors. The plane spanned by u and v is denoted
by span(u,v), and the angle between u and v is denoted by arc(u,v).
A matrix game is specified by a triple (S,Q,G), where S and Q are finite sets
denoting player 1 and 2’s actions sets, respectively. The matrix G ∈ R|S|×|Q| is the
payoff matrix whose element Gs,q is player 1’s payoff, or player 2’s penalty, if player
1 and 2 play s ∈ S and q ∈Q, respectively. In this matrix game, player 1 and player 2
are the maximizer and minimizer, respectively. This paper considers mixed strategy
as players’ strategy space. Player 1’s mixed strategy x¯ ∈ ∆(S) is a probability over
player 1’s action set S. Player 2’s mixed strategy y¯ ∈ ∆(Q) is defined in the same
way. Player 1’s expected payoff is γ(x¯, y¯) = Ex¯,y¯(Gs,q) = x¯
TGy¯. Since both players
use mixed strategies, there always exists a Nash Equilibrium (x¯∗, y¯∗) such that
γ(x¯, y¯∗)≤ γ(x¯∗, y¯∗)≤ γ(x¯∗, y¯),∀x¯ ∈ ∆(S)y¯ ∈ ∆(Q),
When Nash Equilibrium exists, the maxmin value meets the minmax value of the
game, i.e. maxx¯∈∆ (S)miny¯∈∆ (Q) γ(x¯, y¯) =miny¯∈∆ (Q)maxx¯∈∆ (S) γ(x¯, y¯). In this case, we
say the game has a value V , and x¯∗, y¯∗ are also called the security strategy of player
1 and 2, respectively. Player 1’s security strategy can be computed by solving the
following linear program [2].
V = max
x¯∈Rn,ℓ∈R
ℓ (1)
s.t.GT x¯≥ ℓ1, (2)
1T x¯= 1, (3)
x¯≥ 0. (4)
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Player 2’s security strategy can be computed by constructing a similar linear program.
This paper considers a special case when player 2’s actions are revealed gradually,
and the size of player 2’s action set is potentially large. Let us suppose that the current
size of player 2’s action set is m, and the size of player 1’s action set is n which is
fixed. At some point, player 2 develops a new action qnew, which introduces a new
column g ∈Rn to the payoff matrix G ∈Rn×m. The change of the payoff matrix may
result in the change of player 1’s security strategy, and hence player 1 may need to re-
run the linear program with extended payoff matrix, as below, to get the new security
strategy x¯∗new.
Vnew = max
x¯∈Rn,ℓ∈R
ℓ (5)
s.t.GT x¯≥ ℓ1 (6)
gT x¯≥ ℓ (7)
1T x¯= 1 (8)
x¯≥ 0 (9)
Comparing the new LP (5-9) with the old one (1-4), we see that the only dif-
ference is the new LP adds one more constraint, equation (7), to the old LP. Our
objective is to find an efficient way to compute the new security strategy of player 1.
Our approach consists of three steps. First, considering the potentially large size
of player 2’s action set, in other words, a potentially large number of constraints in the
LP problem, we propose to use shadow vertex simplex method, whose average com-
putational complexity is low with respect to the constraint size, as the basic method
to solve the LP. Second, we propose a necessary and sufficient condition guarantee-
ing player 1’s security strategy remains unchanged. If such a condition is violated,
we then propose an iterative algorithm to reduce the computational time based on the
transient results of the previous computation process.
3 Shadow Vertex Simplex Method with a Probability Variable
The shadow vertex simplex method was introduced in [4], and is motivated by the ob-
servation that the simplex method is very simple in two dimensions when the feasible
set forms a polygon. In this case, simplex method visits the adjacent vertices, whose
total number is usually small in two dimensional cases, until it reaches the optimum
vertex. The basic idea of the shadow vertex simplex method consists of two steps.
It first projects a high dimensional feasible set to a two dimensional plane such that
the projection of the optimum vertex is still a vertex of the projection (or shadow) of
the feasible set. Then it walks along the adjacent vertices whose projections are also
vertices of the shadow of the feasible set until it reaches the optimum vertex.
In order to use the shadow vertex method, we need to transform the LP (1-4) into
the canonical form. The canonical form of LP (5-9) can be easily derived by replacing
G in (10-12) with [G g]. Let x= [x¯1 x¯2 . . . , x¯n−1 ℓ]
T . We have x¯= [T 0]x+ en, where
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T = [In−1 − 1]
T , and en is the nth column of In. LP (1-4) is rewritten as below.
V =max
x∈Rn
cT x (10)
s.t.Ax≤ b, (11)
where c= [0T1]T , b= [eTnG 1 0
T ]T , and
A=

−GTT 11T 0
−In−1 0

 . (12)
We call the first m constraints in (10-11) the normal constraints, and the last n con-
straints the probability constraints. Notice that the last n constraints cannot be active
at the same time.
3.1 Initial shadow vertex, projection plane, and initial searching table
Denote the feasible set of LP (10-11) by X . We set x0 = [0 mini=1,...,mGn,i]
T to be the
initial vertex. Given a feasible solution x∈Rn, we say constraint i is active if Aix= bi.
Let Ω0 = {i : Aix0 = bi} be the initial active constraint set, where Ai is the ith row
of A. Next, we will introduce the necessary and sufficient condition of optimality in
terms of active constraint set. The theorem is similar to lemma 1.1 of [5] except that
we don’t require b to be positive.
Theorem 1 Consider a general linear program in canonical form.
max
x∈Rn
cT x
s.t.Ax≤ b,
where A ∈ Rm×n. Let x0 be a vertex and Ω0 be the corresponding active constraint
set. Then x0 is maximal with respect to w
T x for some w ∈Rn \{0} if and only if there
exists a non-negative vector ρ ∈ R|Ω0| such that
w=
|Ω0|
∑
i=1
ρiA
T
Ω i0
, (13)
where Ω i0 is the ith element in Ω0.
Proof. Assume that equation (13) holds. We know that AΩ i0
x0 = bΩ i0
≥ AΩ i0
x for any
feasible x, which implies that wT x0 ≥ w
T x for any feasible x.
Now assume thatwT x0≥w
T x for any feasible x. According to the inhomogeneous
Farkas Theorem [9], we derive that w = ∑mi=1 ρiA
T
i for some nonnegative vector ρ
satisfying ∑mi=1 ρibi ≤ w
T x0 = ∑
m
i=1 ρiAix0. It implies that ∑i/∈Ω0 ρi(bi− Aix0) ≤ 0.
Since ρi ≥ 0 and bi−Aix0 > 0 for i /∈ Ω0, the inequality holds only if ρi = 0 for
i /∈Ω0, and equation (13) is true.
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From theorem 1, we see that searching for the optimum vertex is the same as
looking for the active constraints whose convex cone contains the objective vector c.
In contrast with Dantzig’g simplex method, which modifies basic variables iteratively
until optimality conditions are satisfied, the shadow vertex method searches for active
constraints. To make the searching process efficient, shadow vertex method limits its
search to shadow vertices which are defined as below.
Definition 1 Let u,v be two linearly independent vectors and Γ be the orthogonal
projection onto span(u,v). A vertex x of a polygon X is called a shadow vertex with
respect to span(u,v) if Γ (x) is a vertex of Γ (X).
An important issue is how to design the two dimensional projection plane span(u,v)
such that both the initial and the optimum vertex are shadow vertices. To this end, we
introduce the relaxed non-degeneracy assumption and a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for a vertex of the feasible set to be a shadow vertex.
Assumption 2. Every n element subset of {A1,A2, . . . ,Am+n,u,c}, where at most n−
1 elements are from {Am+1, . . . ,Am+n}, is linearly independent, and {A1,A2, . . . ,Am+n}
is in general position with respect to b, i.e. for any n element subset Ω of {1, . . . ,m+
n} such that there exists an x ∈Rn satisfying AΩx= bΩ , Aix 6= bi for all i /∈Ω .
Assumption 2 guarantees that for any vertex x, there are only n active constraints.
The main difference between the relaxed non-degeneracy assumption and the non-
degeneracy assumption in [5] is that we allow the last n constraints to be linearly
dependent. This difference doesn’t influence the necessary and sufficient condition
of a shadow vertex (Lemma 1.2 in [5]), and the proof is also similar. For the com-
pleteness of this paper, we give the theorem and the proof as follows.
Theorem 3 Consider LP problem (10-11), and suppose Assumption 2 holds. Let x0
be a vertex of the feasible set X of (11), and Γ : X → span(u,v) be the orthogonal
projection map from X to span(u,v). The following three conditions are equivalent.
1. x0 is a shadow vertex.
2. The projection of x0 is on the boundary of the projection of X, i.e.Γ (x0)∈ ∂Γ (X).
3. There exists a vector w ∈ Rn \ {0} in span(u,v) such that wT x0 =maxx∈X w
T x.
Proof. 1) ⇒ 2): It is clear that if x0 is a shadow vertex, its projection lies in the
boundary of Γ (X).
2)⇒ 3): Let Γ (x0) ∈ ∂Γ (X). Because of the convexity of the Γ (X), there must
exist a w ∈ span(u,c)\{0} such that wTΓ (x0)≥ w
TΓ (x) for any x ∈ X . Meanwhile,
we know that x−Γ (x)⊥span(u,c), and hence wT x= wTΓ (x) for any x ∈ X . There-
fore, we have wT x0 ≥ w
T x for any x ∈ X .
3)⇒ 1): Now let’s assume that 3) is true. Because x−Γ (x)⊥span(u,c) and w ∈
span(u,c), we know that Γ (x0) is the maximal relative to w for x ∈Γ (X). Therefore,
Γ (x0) is in the boundary of the shadow Γ (X). Since Γ (X) is a two-dimensional
polygon, if Γ (x0) is not a vertex, then it must lies inside an edge.
Together with the fact that Γ (x0) is the optimum w.r.t w, we know that w is
orthogonal to the edge, and there exists a v ∈ span(u,c) \ {0} such that w⊥v and
Γ (x0) is the maximal relative to w+ εv for any x ∈ Γ (X) if and only if ε = 0. Since
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x−Γ (x)⊥span(u,c) and w+ εv ∈ span(u,c), we know that x0 is also maximal rela-
tive to w+ εv if and only if ε = 0 for any x ∈ X .
Let Ω0 be the active constraint set when x= x0. Assumption 2 indicates that there
are n elements in Ω0. Since x0 is maximal relative to w, according to Theorem 1,
w = ∑ni=1 ρiA
T
Ω i0
6= 0 for ρ ≥ 0. Let v = ∑ni=1 αiA
T
Ω i0
, and hence w+ εv = ∑ni=1(ρi+
εαi)A
T
Ω i0
. x0 is not maximal relative to w+ εv for ε > 0 implies that there exists an l
such that ρl+ εαl < 0 for any ε > 0, and from the continuity of the function, we see
that ρl + 0αl = 0. Similarly, x0 is not maximal relative to w+ εv for ε < 0 implies
that there exists a k such that ρk + εαk < 0 for any ε < 0, and the continuity of the
function implies that ρk+0αk = 0. Moreover, together with the fact that ρi+ εαi is a
linear function of ε for i= l,k, we see that l 6= k.
Therefore, we know that at least 2 elements of ρ is 0, and we have
w= β1u+β2c=
n
∑
i=1,i6=k,l
ρiA
T
Ω i0
. (14)
Since constraint m+ 1, . . . ,m+ n cannot be active at the same time, Ω0 contains at
most n−1 elements from {m+1,m+2, . . . ,m+n}. Therefore, equation (14) contra-
dicts Assumption 2, and Γ (x0) is a vertex of Γ (X).
Theorem 3 implies that if we choose the projection plane to contain the objective
vector c, then the optimum vertex is a shadow vertex. According to Theorem 1, if we
construct an auxiliary objective vector u = ∑
|Ω0|
i=1 ρiA
T
Ω i0
6= 0 for some non-negative
ρi’s, which is linearly independent of c, then the initial vertex x0 is optimal with
respect to u, and hence x0 is a shadow vertex with respect to span(u,c) according to
the shadow vertex condition (3).
Now that we have found the initial vertex, the initial active constraint set and the
projection plane, it is time to build the searching table. The basic idea of constructing
the table is to find a linear combination of active constraint vectors for objective
vector c, auxiliary objective vector u and all other constraint vectors. Given any active
constraint set Ω0, we construct the searching table in the following way. The first
row consists of an n-dimensional row vector α and a scalar Qc which satisfies c =
∑nj=1 α jAΩ j0
and Qc = −∑
n
j=1 α jbΩ j0
. The second row consists of an n-dimensional
row vector β and a scalarQu which satisfies u=∑
n
j=1 β jAΩ j0
andQu =−∑
n
j=1β jbΩ j0
.
Each row for the next m+ n rows consists of an n-dimensional row vector γi and a
scalar φi which satisfies Ai = ∑
n
j=1 γi jAΩ j0
and φi = bi−∑
n
j=1 γi jbΩ j0
. Notice that the
objective value is −Qc and feasibility is implied by non-negativity of φ j’s. We build
the initial table using the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4 (Initialization).
1. Find l such that Gn,l =min jGn, j.
2. Let Ω0 = {l,m+ 2, . . . ,m+ n}.
3. Find β > 0 such that u= ∑nj=1β jAΩ j0
satisfies Assumption 2.
4. Compute Qu =−∑
n
j=1 β jbΩ j0
.
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5. Compute α such that c= ∑nj=1 α jAΩ j0
.
α j =
{
1, if j = 1
Al, j−1, if j 6= 1
6. Compute Qc =−∑
n
j=1α jbΩ j0
.
7. Compute γi such that Ai = ∑
n
j=1 γi jAΩ j0
,∀i= 1, . . . ,m+ n.
γi j =
{
1, if j = 1 and i≤ m
Al, j−1−Ai, j−1, if j 6= 1 and i≤ m.
γm+1 =[0 − 1 . . . − 1],
γm+ j =e j,∀ j = 2, . . . ,n.
8. Compute φi = bi−∑
n
j=1 γi jbΩ j0
, for all i= 1, . . . ,m+ n.
9. Record the initial table table(0) and the initial active constraint set Ω0.
3.2 Pivot step
Suppose the current shadow vertex is xt , and the corresponding table and active con-
straint set ∆t are given. We first check whether xt is the optimum vertex. If not, we
search for the adjacent shadow vertex with a larger objective value (if exists). This is
called ’taking a pivot step’.
According to Theorem 1, if αi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . ,n, then xt is the optimum
vertex, and the search ends. Otherwise, we need to find an adjacent shadow vertex
with a larger objective value. To this end, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1.4 in [5]) Consider LP problem (10-11). Suppose u is lin-
early independent with c. Let x0,x1, . . . ,xt be the maximal vertices with respect to
wT0 x,w
T
1 x, . . . ,w
T
t x, where wi ∈ span(u,c)\{0}, w0 = u, and arc(wi,c)> arc(wi+1,c)
for i= 0, . . . , t− 1. Then
cT xi < c
T xi+1,∀i= 0, . . . , t− 1.
With Lemma 1, we build a vector w(µ) = u+ µc. Let wt = w(µt) where µt is
the smallest non-negative µ such that the current shadow vertex xt is maximal with
respect to w(µt )
T x. If t = 0, then µt = 0. The basic idea of pivot is to increase µ
from µt to µt+1 such that xt won’t be the maximum with respect to w(µt+1+ ε) for
any ε > 0, and then find the next shadow vertex xt+1 which is maximal with respect
to wt+1 = w(µt+1). Since arc(wt ,c) > arc(wt+1,c), we assure that xt+1 has a larger
objective value than xt according to Lemma 1.
Now, let us take a closer look on how the pivot step is done. First, we rewrite
w(µ) =∑ni=1(βi+µαi)AΩ it . Since xt is not maximal with respect to c, there must exist
an i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that αi < 0, and βi+ µαi decreases to negative as µ increases.
If βk + µαk first decreases to 0 for some µ = µt+1, then we shall replace Ω
k
t with
another constraint out of Ωt such that the new vertex xt+1 formed by the new active
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constraint set Ωt+1 is the maximal relative to w(µt+1+ ε) = u+(µt+1+ ε)c where
ε is an arbitrary small positive number. In this way, the moving out active constraint
Ω kt is figured out where
k = argmin
i∈{1,...,n},αi<0
−
βi
αi
. (15)
The above analysis elucidates which constraint in the active constraint set should
be replaced to increase the objective value. Next, we will discuss which inactive con-
straint should be moved into the active constraint set to guarantee feasibility. First
of all, the moving-in constraint i should satisfy γik < 0. If γik ≥ 0 for all i, then Ak
and all A j’s for j /∈ Ω lies in the same half space divided by the hyperplane through
points 0,AΩ1t , . . . ,AΩ k−1t
,A
Ω k+1t
, . . . ,AΩnt , and c lies on the other half space. Therefore,
c doesn’t lie in the convex cone of A1, . . . ,Am+n, which means that the LP problem
has no solution, and the search stops. If there exists at least one inactive constraint i
such that γik < 0, let us suppose that we choose constraint l satisfying γlk < 0 as the
moving in constraint. The table will be updated as follows [5].
α j =
{
α j−αk
γl j
γlk
if j 6= k
αk
γlk
if j = k
(16)
β j =
{
β j−βk
γl j
γlk
if j 6= k
βk
γlk
if j = k
(17)
γi j =
{
γi j− γik
γl j
γlk
if j 6= k and i /∈Ωt+1
γik
γlk
if j = k and i /∈Ωt+1
(18)
γi =ek, if i= l. (19)
and
φi =
{
0 if i ∈Ωt+1
φi−
γik
γlk
φl if i /∈Ωt+1
(20)
Qc =Qc−
φlαk
γlk
(21)
Qu =Qu−
φlβk
γlk
(22)
As mentioned before, the non-negativity of φi’s implies feasibility. Therefore, accord-
ing to (20) and the analysis above, the moving in constraint l is chosen such that
l = argmax
i/∈Ωt ,γik<0
φi
γik
, (23)
and the active constraint set is updated to Ωt+1 = {Ω
1
t , . . . ,Ω
k−1
t , l,Ω
k+1
t , . . . ,Ω
n
t }.
The pivot algorithm given the current active constraint set Ωt is provided as fol-
lows.
Algorithm 5 (Pivot).
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1. If αi ≥ 0 for all i, then the vertex associated with Ωt is the optimum, and v=−Qc.
Go to step 8).
2. Find the moving-out constraint Ω kt , where k is given in (15).
3. If γik ≥ 0 for all i /∈Ωt , then there is no solution. Go to step 8).
4. Find the moving-in constraint l satisfying (23).
5. Update and record Ωt+1 = {Ω
1
t , . . . ,Ω
k−1
t , l,Ω
k+1
t , . . . ,Ω
n
t }.
6. Update the table according to (16-22), and record it as table(t+ 1).
7. Return to step 1).
8. End.
Shadow vertex simplex method has a polynomial computational complexity [5].
To be more specific, let τ be the number of pivot steps, and T be the number of
shadow vertices. If A1,A2, . . . ,Am and c are independently, identically, and symmet-
rically distributed under rotation, then E(t) ≤ E(T ) ≤ ρm
1
n−1 n3 for some positive
constant ρ .
4 Player 1’s Unchanging security strategy
It is not necessary to run the shadow vertex simplex method every time player 2 adds
a new action since player 2’s new action may have no influence on player 1’s security
strategy and the game value. Comparing the old LP (1-4) with the new LP (5-9), we
see that the new LP adds a new constraint (7) to the old LP. Geometrically, a new
constraint means a new cut of the existing feasibility set. If the new constraint does
not cut the optimum vertex off, i.e. the optimum vertex satisfies the new constraint,
then the optimum vertex remains the same, and player 1’s security strategy does not
change. To formally state the above analysis, we first provide the canonical form of
the new LP (5-9).
As mentioned before, the canonical form of (5-9) takes the same form as in (10-
11) except that the payoff matrix is replaced with [G g]. To make the discussion clear,
we provide the canonical form of (5-9) as below.
Vnew =max
x∈Rn
cT x (24)
s.t.Aˆx≤ bˆ, (25)
where
Aˆ= [AT1:m [gn− g1 gn− g2 . . . gn− gn−1 1]
TATm+1:m+n]
T ,
and
bˆ= [bT1:m gn b
T
m+1:m+n]
T .
The new constraint in the new LP (5-9) is transformed to
[gn− g1 gn− g2 . . . gn− gn−1 1]x≤ gn. (26)
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Let x∗ be the optimal solution of old LP
(10-11). The old optimal solution x∗ remains optimal in the new LP (24-25) if and
only if x∗ satisfies the new constraint (26).
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Proof. It is easy to see that if x∗ is the optimal solution of (24-25), then x∗ satisfies
the new constraint. For the opposite direction, with one more constraint, the feasible
set of new LP (24-25) is included in the feasible set of old LP (10-11). So we have
Vnew≤V , in other words, x
+
n ≤ x
∗
n, where x
+ indicates the optimal solution of (24-25).
Meanwhile, if [gn− g1 gn− g2 . . . gn− gn−1 1]x
∗ ≤ gn, it is easy to see that x
∗ is a
feasible solution of (24-25), and we have x∗n ≤ x
+
n . Therefore, x
∗
n = x
+
n , and x
∗ is the
optimal solution of (24-25).
Since the re-computation is not always necessary, we are interested in the proba-
bility of the re-computation.
Assumption 7. The old LP problem (10-11) has a unique optimal solution.
Assumption 8. Consider the canonical form of the new LP problem (24-25). Suppose
Assumption 2 holds. Any n-element subset ∆ of {1, . . . ,m,m+1,m+2 . . . ,m+1+n}
such that A∆1 , . . . ,A∆n are linearly independent has the same probability to be the
active constraint set with respect to the optimum of the new LP problem (24-25), i.e.
P(∆ is an active constraint set) =
1(
m+1+n
n
)
− 1
, (27)
where |∆ |= n and A∆1 , . . . ,A∆n are linearly independent
The relaxed non-degeneracy assumption 2 indicates that there are n elements in
every active constraint set, and any n rows, except the last n rows, of A are linearly
independent. Therefore, there are
(
m+1+n
n
)
− 1 possible active constraint sets, and
since each set has the same probability to be active, we have equation (27).
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 2, 7 and 8 hold. The unique optimal solution x∗ of
the old LP (10-11) is not optimal any more in the new LP (24-25) if and only if the
new constraint (26) is an active constraint for any optimum of the new LP (24-25),
i.e. [gn−g1 gn−g2 . . . gn−gn−1 1]x
+ = gn, where x
+ is any optimum of the new LP
(24-25).
Proof. Suppose x∗ is not an optimum of the new LP. According to Theorem 6, we
have Aˆm+1x
∗ > bˆm+1. If there exists an optimum x
+ 6= x∗ of the new LP such that
Aˆm+1x
+ < bˆm+1, then there must exist an x = αx
+ +(1−α)x∗ such that Aˆm+1x =
bˆm+1. It is easy to verify that x is a feasible solution of the new LP. Since x
+ is an
optimum of the new LP, we have cT x+ ≥ cT x. Meanwhile, x∗ is the unique optimum
of old LP implies that cT x+ < cT x∗, and we have cT x=αcT x++(1−α)cT x∗> cT x+,
which is a contraction. Therefore, the new constraint is active for any optimum of the
new LP.
Suppose the new constraint is active for any optimum of new LP (24-25). The
old optimum x∗ cannot be an optimum of the new LP, since its corresponding active
constraint set only contains the old constraints.
Theorem 9 Consider the canonical form of the new LP problem (24-25). Suppose
Assumption 2, 7 and 8 hold. The probability that player 1’s security strategy changes
is n
m+1+n−(m+1)/(m+nn )
.
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Proof. Player 1’s security strategy changes if and only if the optimum x∗ of the old LP
(10-11) is not optimal any more in the new LP. According to Lemma 2, it is the same
to say that the new constraint Aˆm+1x ≤ bˆm+1 is an active constraint in the canon-
ical form of the new LP problem. We have P(player 1’s security strategy changes)
= P(constraint m+ 1 is an active constraint).
P(constraint m+ 1 is an active constraint)
= ∑
{i1,...,in−1}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P({i1, . . . , in−1,m+ 1} is the active constraint set)
=
(
m+ n
n− 1
)
1(
m+1+n
n
)
− 1
=
n
m+ 1+ n− (m+ 1)/
(
m+n
n
) .
Theorem 9 implies that as m grows, the probability to recompute the security
strategy decreases. This is because as the size of constraints grows, the feasible set
shrinks, and it is less possible for the new constraint to cut the optimum vertex off.
5 Iterative shadow vertex simplex method
If the old security strategy is not optimal any more in the new game, it is not always
necessary to start the optimum search from the initial vertex. Suppose that we have
constructed a complete shadow vertex path Π = {x0,x1, . . . ,xτ−1,x
∗}when searching
for the optimum of the old LP (10-11). When the new constraint (26) is added, we
can test the feasibility of the visited shadow vertices one by one starting from x0
until we find one that fails the feasibility test. That last vertex should have the largest
objective value, and will be chosen as the starting point of the new search. This idea
is formulated as the iterative shadow vertex simplex method as follows.
Algorithm 10 (Iterative shadow vertex algorithm).
1. If x∗ satisfies (26), then x∗ is the optimal solution. Go to step 6).
2. Otherwise, set the new path Πnew = /0.
3. From i= 0 to τ−1, test whether xi satisfies the new constraint (26). If yes, add xi
into the new path Πnew, and update table(i) by inserting a new row vector γm+1
and a new scalar φm+1 with respect to the new constraint. Otherwise, stop the
test.
4. If Πnew = /0, then run standard shadow vertex algorithm, i.e. run the initializa-
tion algorithm 4, and then the pivot algorithm 5. Add all visited shadow vertices
including the optimal vertex into Πnew. Update Π = Πnew. Go to step 6).
5. Otherwise, choose the last element in Πnew as the initial shadow vertex, and run
the pivot algorithm 5. Add all visited shadow vertices including the optimal vertex
to Πnew. Update Π = Πnew. Go to step 6).
6. End.
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Since the iterative shadow vertex simplex method usually starts the search from
a shadow vertex with a larger objective value, we expect that the iterative shadow
vertex simplex method has less pivot steps and lower computational complexity than
the shadow vertex simplex method. To analyze the computational complexity of the
former, we start from the following lemma stating that if the new constraint does
not cut the whole path off, then with the iterative shadow vertex method, the new
constraint stays in the active constraint set until the optimum vertex is found.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 2 holds, and the optimum x∗ of the old LP (10-11)
violates the new constraint (26). Let Π = {x0,x1, . . . ,xτ−1,x
∗} be a complete search
path of the old LP (10-11), i.e. {x0,x1, . . . ,xτ−1,x
∗} is a sequence of adjacent shadow
vertices, and {Ω0, . . . ,Ωτ} be the corresponding active constraint set. Denote xt ∈Π
the last shadow vertex in path Π satisfying the new constraint, i.e
cT xt =max
xi∈Π
cT xi (28)
s.t.Aˆm+1xi ≤ bˆm+1. (29)
With the iterative shadow vertex simplex algorithm 10, let Πnew = {x0,x1, . . . ,xt , xˆt+1,
. . . , xˆτˆ−1,x
+} be the search path of the new LP (24-25), and Ω0,Ω1, . . . ,Ωt ,Ωˆt+1, . . . ,
Ωˆτˆ−1,Ωˆτˆ be the corresponding active constraint sets. The new constraint (26) stays
in the active constraint set {Ωˆt+1, . . . ,Ωˆτˆ}, i.e. m+ 1∈ Ωˆi for all i= t+ 1, . . . , τˆ .
Proof. First, we show that Ωˆt+1 contains m+ 1. Suppose in the search path Π from
step xt to xt+1, the move-out constraint is k and the move-in constraint is l. In the
search process of the new LP from xt to xˆt+1, if the new constraint Aˆm+1x ≤ bˆm+1 is
not chosen either because γm+1,k ≥ 0 or because φm+1/γm+1,k is not the maximal one,
l will be chosen again to enter the active constraint set which implies that xˆt+1 = xt+1
based on Assumption 2. Since the pivot step guarantees feasibility, we have xt+1 sat-
isfies the new constraint. Meanwhile, we also have cT xt+1 > c
Txt , which contradicts
equation (28-29). Therefore, m+ 1 must be in Ωˆt+1.
Next, we show that once constraint m+ 1 enters the active constraint set, it will
stay there until the optimum vertex is found. Let us suppose that Ωˆt+i containsm+1,
but Ωˆt+i+1 does not, for some i= 1, . . . , τˆ− t−1. Since xt and xˆt+i+1 are both shadow
vertices, there must exist wt ,wt+i+1 ∈ span(u,v) such that xt , xˆt+i+1 are the maximum
with respect to wt and wt+i+1, respectively, according to Theorem 3. The pivot rule of
shadow vertex simplex method guarantees that arc(wt ,c)> arc(wt+i+1,c) andwt+i+1
is in the convex cone formed by wt and c. Meanwhile, xˆt+i+1 guarantees value im-
provement and feasibility, i.e. cT xˆt+i+1 > c
T xt and Aˆm+1xˆt+i+1 ≤ bˆm+1. According to
(28-29), we see that xˆt+i+1 is not in the search path Π of the old LP, and wt+i+1 does
not lie in the convex cone formed by wt and c, which contradicts the previous conclu-
sion. Therefore, if Ωˆt+i containsm+1, so does Ωˆt+i+1 for all i= 1, . . . , τˆ− t−1.
Lemma 3 implies that the iterative shadow vertex simplex method only visits
shadow vertices whose active constraint set contains m+ 1, and the number of pivot
steps τˆ can thus be no greater than the number of shadow vertices Tˆ whose active
constraint set contains m+ 1. We are interested in the expected value of Tˆ .
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Assumption 11. Consider the canonical form of the new LP problem (24-25). Sup-
pose Assumption 2 holds. Any n-element subset Ω of {1, . . . ,m,m+ 1,m+ 2 . . . ,m+
1+ n} such that AΩ1 , . . . ,AΩn are linearly independent has the same probability
ξ ∈ (0,1) to form a shadow vertex with respect to span(u,c).
Theorem 12 Suppose Assumption 2 and 11 hold. We have
E(Tˆ ) =
n
m+ 1+ n− (m+1)/
(
m+n
n
)E(T ).
Proof. First, notice that
E(T ) = ∑
{i1,i2,...,in}∈{1,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, i2, . . . , in forms a shadow vertex).
Since the last n constraints can not form a vertex, together with Assumption 11, it can
be shown that E(T ) = (
(
m+1+n
n
)
− 1)ξ .
Next, we haveE(Tˆ )= ∑
{i1,...,in−1}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraints i1, i2, . . . , in−1,
m+ 1 form a shadow vertex) =
(
m+n
n−1
)
ξ . Therefore, we have
E(Tˆ ) =
n
m+ 1+ n− (m+1)/
(
m+n
n
)E(T ).
Notice that if the computational complexity of shadow vertex simplex method
is O(m
1
n−1 n3) as shown in [5], then the computational complexity of the iterative
shadow vertex method is O(m
1
n−1−1n4). If n > 2, then the computational complexity
of the iterative shadow vertex decreases as m grows. This is because as m grows, it is
less possible to re-compute the security strategy (Theorem 9), which results in zero
pivot step and the decreased number of average pivot steps.
Under the assumption that x∗ violates new constraint (26), we will analyze the
computational complexity of both shadow vertex method and iterative shadow vertex
method.
Theorem 13 Suppose Assumption 2 and 11 holds. Let x∗ be the optimal vertex of
the old LP (10-11). If the new payoff column g is independently distributed with the
existing payoff matrix G, then
E(Tˆ |x∗ violates (26))< E(T |x∗ violates (26)).
Proof. First, we have
E(Tˆ |x∗ does not violate (26))
= ∑
{i1,...,in−1}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in−1,m+ 1 form a shadow vertex
|x∗ does not violate (26)).
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Similarly, we have
E(T |x∗ does not violate (26))
= ∑
{i1,...,in}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in form a shadow vertex
|x∗ does not violate (26))
+ ∑
{i1,...,in−1}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in−1,m+ 1 form a shadow vertex
|x∗ does not violate (26))
= ∑
{i1,...,in}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in form a shadow vertex
|x∗ does not violate (26))+E(Tˆ |x∗ does not violate (26))
According to Theorem 3 and 1, constraint i1, . . . , in form a shadow vertex if and only
if the convex cone generated by Ai1 , . . . ,Ain intersects with the plane spanned by u
and c. Since constraint i1, . . . , in are chosen from the existing constraints which are
independent with the new constraint (26), the event that the convex cone generated
by existing constraint vectors Ai1 , . . . ,Ain intersects with the plane spanned by u and
c is independent with the event that the new constraint (26) cuts x∗ off, and hence we
have
∑
{i1,...,in}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in form a shadow vertex
|x∗ does not violate (26))
= ∑
{i1,...,in}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
P(constraint i1, . . . , in form a shadow vertex)
= ∑
{i1,...,in}∈{1,...,m,m+2,...,m+1+n}
ε > 0
which completes the proof.
The above analysis assumes that we have a complete search path Π of the old LP.
Sometimes, the new constraint may cut off a part of the search path but not the optimal
vertex. In this case, we can immediately provide the optimal vertex, and then repair
the search path in the background to get prepared for player 2’s next new action. The
idea of repairing the search path is similar to the iterative shadow vertex method, and
we provide the algorithm as follows.
Algorithm 14 (Search path repair algorithm).
1. If x∗ violates the new constraint (26), go to step 8).
2. Set Πnew = /0 and tablenew = /0.
3. From i= 0 to τ−1, if xi satisfies the new constraint, then add xi into the new path
Πnew and update tablenew(i) by inserting a new row vector γm+1 and a new scalar
φm+1 with respect to the new constraint to table(i). Otherwise, stop the test.
4. If all the elements in Π satisfies the new constraint, go to step 8).
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5. Repair the search path.
(a) Let j =−1.
(b) Let j = j+ 1. Choose the last element in Πnew as the initial shadow vertex,
and run step 2)-7) of the pivot algorithm, Algorithm 5. Add the visited shadow
vertex xi+ j to Πnew and update tablenew(i+ j).
(c) If xi+ j ∈ Π or xi+ j is the optimal vertex, then go to step 6). Otherwise, go to
step b).
6. Add all the visited shadow vertices after xi+ j in path Π to the new path Πnew.
Update the corresponding tables by inserting a new row vector γm+1 and a new
scalar φm+1 with respect to the new constraint, and add the updated tables to
tablenew.
7. Let table= tablenew, and Π = Πnew.
8. End.
6 Numerical examples
In this section, we consider several numerical examples to demonstrate the compu-
tational properties of the iterative shadow vertex method, and compare them to our
theoretical predictions in Section 4 and 5.
We first generate a 10×100 random payoffmatrix whose elements are identically,
independently, and uniformly distributed among the integers from −100 to 100, then
solve the corresponding zero-sum game using regular shadow vertex method, and
record all visited shadow vertices and the corresponding tables. Then, the column
player generates a new action, and hence produces a new random payoff column
whose elements are identically, independently, and uniformly distributed among the
integers from −100 to 100. Notice that the newly generated payoff column is in-
dependent of the existing payoff matrix. After the new action is generated, we first
decide whether re-computation of the security strategy is necessary according to The-
orem 6. If so, we use both regular shadow vertex method and iterative shadow vertex
method to find the new security strategy, and record the numbers of pivot steps of
both methods. This experiment is run 500 times. Following the same steps, we also
test iterative shadow vertex method in 10× 200, 10× 300, . . ., 10× 1000 payoff ma-
trices. The probability of re-computing the security strategy, the average number of
pivot steps, and the average number of pivot steps conditioned on re-computation are
given in the plots in Figure 1, where x-axis is the size of the action set of player 2.
The top plot of Figure 1 shows the probability that player 1’s security strategy
changes. The x-axis is the original size of the action set of player 2. The red stars
are the analytical probability computed according to Theorem 9, and the blue circles
are the empirical probability derived from the simulation results. We see that the
simulated results match the analytical results. Meanwhile, we also notice that the
probability of re-computing security strategy is decreasing with respect to m, the size
of the action set of player 2, which meets our expectation.
The middle plot of Figure 1 gives the average number (blue circles) of pivot steps
of iterative shadow vertex method, and the appropriately scaled average number of
(red stars) of pivot steps of regular shadow vertex method in accordance with the re-
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Fig. 1 The x-axis is the original size of player 2’s action set, and the size of player 1’s action set is
fixed to be 10. The top plot is the probability that player 1’s security strategy changes when player 2
adds a new action, where red stars are the theoretical results according to Theorem 9, and blue circles
are probability based on the simulation results. The middle plot is the expected number of pivot steps of
iterative shadow vertex method, where red stars are the theoretical upper bounds computed according to
Theorem 12, and blue circles are the average number of pivot steps based on simulation results. The bottom
plot is the average number of pivot steps conditioned on recomputation of player 1’s security strategy based
on simulation results, where red stars are the average number of pivot steps using regular shadow vertex
method, and blue circles are the average number of pivot steps using iterative shadow vertex method.
sult in Theorem 12. We see that the blue circles and red stars decreases in the same
manner as the size of player 2’s action set grows. It matches the result shown in Theo-
rem 12 which indicates that the computational complexity of iterative shadow vertex
method and the appropriately scaled computational complexity of regular shadow
vertex method are the same.
The bottom plot of Figure 1 shows that the average number (blue circles) of pivot
steps of iterative shadow vertex method is always less than the average number (red
stars) of pivot steps of regular shadow vertex method conditioned on the situation that
player 1 needs to re-compute the security strategy, which agrees with the theoretical
predictions of theorem 13.
7 Case study: urban security problem
We now consider a more applied example inspired by the urban security scenario
introduced in [12]. In this paper, an urban area is modeled as a graph where edges
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Fig. 2 The map of an urban area, where edges and vertices denote roads and points of interest. Blue
circles are source nodes, and red squares are targets. The defenders can use an expected number of 3 edges
to set checkpoints, and the attackers always use the shortest path to attack the targets. If a checkpoint is
in the path of the attacker, defenders get reward 1, 0 otherwise. The defenders’ security strategy is to set
a checkpoint on the highlighted red edges with equal probability 3
7
, and the game value is 3
7
. Notice that
the highlighted edges are also the minimum number of edges that can cut all paths (only shortest paths are
considered here) from sources to targets.
denote roads, and vertices denote places of interest. This area have several main en-
trances denoted as source nodes in the graph, and several targets that attackers want
to attack. With limited resources, defenders need to set up checkpoints on edges. If
a checkpoint is in the path of the attackers, defenders get a corresponding reward.
Otherwise, penalty is issued to the defenders.
We particularize this model to the map of Figure 2 with 3 source nodes indicated
by blue circles and 4 targets indicated by red squares. This map contains 36 nodes
and 60 edges. We assume that the attackers use the shortest path to hit the target, and
the defenders can use an expected number of 3 edges. If a checkpoint is in the path of
the attackers, defenders get reward 1, 0 otherwise. Let xi indicate the probability that
a checkpoint is set on edge i, and y j indicate the probability that attackers choose path
j. The urban security problem can be modeled as the following maxmin problem.
V = max
x∈R60
min
y∈∆ (P)
xTGy,
s.t.0≤ x≤ 1
1Tx= 3
where P is the set of paths that attackers can take. Notice that xi is the probability that
a checkpoint is set on edge i, but the vector x is not a probability vector. The con-
straint 1T x= 3 corresponds to the requirement that the defenders can use an expected
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number of 3 edges. According to the strong duality theorem, it can be transformed to
an LP problem
V = max
x∈R60
ℓ,
s.t.GT x≥ ℓ1
0≤ x≤ 1
1Tx= 3
The corresponding canonical form is as follows.
V = max
x∈R60
[0 . . .0 1]x,
s.t.


−GTT 1
1T 0
−In−1 0
In−1 0

x≤


3GTen
3
0
1


We use regular shadow vertex method to solve this problem, and find that the security
strategy is to set up checkpoints at red highlighted edges with probability 3
7
, and the
value of the game is 3
7
. With 2.4GHz CPU and 4GBmemory, the computation time is
about 0.35 seconds, which is comparable to the time reported in [12] to compute an
equilibrium strategy for a grid of similar size (35 nodes and 58 edges) representing
south Mumbai. Notice that the highlighted edges are also the minimum number of
edges that can cut all paths (only shortest paths are considered here) from sources to
targets.
Now, assuming there is a new target in the map, we use the iterative shadow vertex
method to update the security strategy. There are two small differences between this
situation and that described earlier: 1) x is not a probability vector, 2) each new target
will result in several new paths, which adds several columns to the payoff matrix
at a time. More precisely, equation (26) is changed to [−gTT 1]x ≤ 3gTen, where
g is the newly added payoff columns. However, these differences only affect our
theoretical investigation of the algorithm, and algorithm 10 is in fact applicable as
is to this scenario as well. We change the new target node from left to right, from
bottom to top. The average computation time is 0.1429 seconds. Compared with the
computation time of regular shadow vertex method, which is about 0.35 seconds,
iterative shadow vertex method cuts more than half of the average computation time.
8 Conclusion and future work
This paper studies how to efficiently update the saddle-point strategy of one player
in a matrix game when the other player can add new actions in the game. We provide
an iterative shadow vertex method to solve this problem, and show that the compu-
tational complexity is strictly less than the regular shadow vertex method. Moreover,
this paper also presents a necessary and sufficient condition that a new saddle-point
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strategy is needed, and analyzes the probability of re-computing the saddle point
strategy. Our simulation results demonstrates the main results.
A direct extension of the problem in this paper is its dual problem, i.e. the case
when player 1 has a growing action set. In this case, the corresponding LP has new
variables whose dual problem is exactly the same problem as studied in this paper.
We can use iterative shadow vertex method to solve its dual problem first, and then
figure out the optimal solution from the optimal solution of its dual problem. A fur-
ther extension is the case when both players have growing action sets. A proposed
direction is to deal with player 2’s new action first, and then deal with player 1’s
action set.
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